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FAILING TO BRIDGE THE GAP: 




Throughout the three post-independence decades (the 1960s, 70s, and 
80s), the Somali economy was characterized by a considerably alarm-
ing foreign aid dependency1 and an ever-growing external borrowing.2 
Even though other factors shall not necessarily be ruled out, the most 
plausible economic explanation of this phenomenon is that the govern-
ment used the external aid and debt to finance its chronic balance of 
payments deficits.
The balance of payments, in simple terms, is where the records of 
the nation’s international transactions (payments to and receipts from 
foreign countries) are kept for a certain period of time, often a year.3 
A nation’s balance of payments is composed of the current account, 
financial account, and capital account. The current account keeps the 
record of the balance of goods and services (trade balance), investment 
income, and unilateral transfers,4 and it is the most important (and 
often the largest) of the three accounts while the capital account is the 
smallest. Although trade balance includes the balance of both goods 
and services, we mainly focus on the merchandise trade balance (the 
balance of goods/commodities) in this paper. Similar to the majority 
of the developing countries, Somalia exported primary products and 
imported manufactured and capital goods, among other commodities. 
Thus, the available exports and imports data is primarily that of goods 
or commodities. The data do not capture the services that the country 
likely imported in this period.
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Developing countries greatly rely on commodity exports which 
account for a substantial share of their GDPs and a sizable portion 
of their export earnings. However, such commodity exports reliance 
is associated with greater uncertainties due to volatile markets and 
prices. We will see in a moment how changes to the banana prices in 
the global markets massively affected the Somali banana industry in 
certain times. On the contrary, developing economies’ acute depen-
dence on manufactured, consumer, and capital goods imports for local 
consumption and production, usually coupled with lower revenues, 
also resulted in a balance of payments problems – chronic current 
account deficits, often offset by capital account surplus (external debt 
and investment) became the norm.5  The Somali economy suffered 
from a persistent balance of payments deficits in most of the period 
under study. In 1985, for instance, the balance of payments deficit 
was US$300 million or, to put it another way, 22 percent of the GDP.6 
However, while underlining that the statistics reported by the govern-
ment were flawed in a number of ways, the World Bank (1981) report 
emphasized that the economy enjoyed a favorable balance of payments 
position in the early 1970s.  Whilst Somalia’s balance of payments 
difficulties could have been unique and had their own causes, the 
balance of payments of the developing countries deteriorated in the 
1980s and 1990s on the ground of a decline in commodity prices, inten-
sifying protectionism in the advanced countries, recessions shrinking 
the international trade, and inadequate exchange rate policies often 
leading to currency overvaluation in certain developing nations.7 The 
next sections will demonstrate whether Somalia shared these reasons 
with the rest of the developing economies.
his article aims to examine Somalia’s trade deficits in 1960-1991 
and particularly focuses on the merchandise trade balance. The study 
covers the period between the independence (1960) and the state col-
lapse (1991) and attempts to understand the role Somalia played in the 
global economy, especially global trade, during those three  decades 
the Somali people witnessed a functioning state of theirs.
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II. Foreign Trade
The Somali economy has always been a highly open economy as 
the exports and imports accounted for a substantial portion of the 
country’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) – an average of 55 percent 
between 1970 and 1990.8 Despite trading with the rest of the world, 
Somalia’s “role in the world economy has long been that of a supplier 
of primary products and an importer of manufactures.”9 The agri-
cultural and pastoral sectors are the most significant sectors of the 
Somali economy serving as primary sources of production and export 
earnings. In the period under study, over 90 percent of the total export 
earnings were generated by the livestock and banana exports, live-
stock being the dominant export product which accounted for 40-85 
percent of earnings.10 Livestock exports were so essential to the Somali 
economy that they accounted for 91 percent of the country’s hard cur-
rency inflow in 1981.11 If we add fishing to these two sectors, the role 
is even bigger. According to Abdi Samatar (1988:89), “[t]he rural sector 
(pastoral, agriculture, and fisheries) is the largest in the Somali econ-
omy, accounting for two-thirds of the gross national product (GNP), 
four-fifths of the labour force, and about 98% of the exports.” How-
ever, notwithstanding the rhetoric of aiming for food sufficiency by the 
successive Somali governments, chiefly the military regime, the local 
production in Somalia, particularly in the area of food, often failed to 
meet the increasing domestic consumption. As a result, between the 
mid-1970s and the late 1980s, “Somalia has become alarmingly, and 
more than any other country in Sub-Saharan Africa, dependent on 
imported food.”12 
Somalia exported live animals to the Gulf Countries and banana to 
Europe. In spite of these two primary products, hides and skins, frank-
incense and myrrh, meat and meat products, and fish and fish prod-
ucts were also exported as elaborated in the next sections. In contrast, 
Somalia imported food, fuel, machinery, electronics, transportation, 
and medicine, among other things from different parts of the world.   
III. Exports
Livestock and banana, as already mentioned, are the primary export 
products and account for over 90 percent of export earnings. They 
are also crucial for the domestic employment, income generation, and 
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government revenues. Other livestock products – hides and skins, 
meat and meat products – also trivially contributed to the export earn-
ings. Frankincense, myrrh, and fish exports played a minor role in 
export earnings as well. Apparently, pastoral and agricultural sectors 
remained to be the most important sectors of the Somali economy. 
In the period of 1975-1985, export earnings peaked in 1982 with 
USD 137 million and hit rock bottom in 1984 with just USD 62 mil-
lion. Furthermore, export earnings were USD 71.3 million in 1977 but 
almost doubled and soared to USD 134 million in 1980 (Figure 1).
Figure 1: Source: World Bank (1987)  
Livestock 
Livestock has always been the mainstay of the Somali economy and 
remained a primary source of livelihood, predominantly in the North 
where majority of the population were nomadic pastoralists. On aver-
age, around 60 percent of the Somali people relied on livestock for 
their subsistence.13 Similarly, livestock production offered around two-
thirds of employment and about half of the country’s GDP.14 Livestock 
remained the chief export commodity over the course of the modern 
history of the Somali State and dominated the nation’s export earnings 
and hard currency inflow. A number of studies recorded the share 
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of livestock exports in Somalia’s total export earnings as follows: 45 
percent (together with the banana exports);15 around two-thirds (66 
percent);16 more than 80 percent;17 below 50 percent in the late 1960s 
and approximately 90 percent in 1978;18 over 70 percent in a given year 
and 91 percent in 1981 alone;19 roughly 80 percent;20 around 98 per-
cent (together with other livestock products, agricultural products, and 
fish);21 and 40-85 percent.22   
Somali livestock was exported to the Gulf Countries and Saudi Ara-
bia in particular. The largest number of heads were exported during 
the Hajj season – when Muslims from all corners of the globe travel to 
Saudi Arabia to perform the Hajj (the annual Muslim pilgrimage). The 
Somali livestock exports soared in the 1970s due to Saudi Arabia’s oil 
boom23 and an increased number of Muslim pilgrims to Saudi Arabia 
thanks to improved modes of transport.24 As a result, the livestock 
exports became largely vulnerable to external shocks from Saudi Ara-
bia. When Saudi Arabia banned Somali livestock imports in 1983 (or 
largely limited its imports until 1988), Somalia’s total export earnings 
dropped by 40 percent in 1983 and 44 percent in 1984 as Saudi Arabia 
imported about 90 percent of the Somali livestock prior to the ban.25 
While livestock exports mostly remained over one million heads in 
the 1970-78 period, seldom fluctuations resulted in exports of below 
one million and over two million in certain years. For instance, exports 




Table 1: Somalia: Livestock Exports, 1970-78 
In Thousand Heads
Year Sheep Goats Cattle Camel Total 
1970 546 605 45 26 1,222
1971 608 576 56 24 1,264
1972 789 828 77 21 1,715
1973 684 639 70 28 1,421
1974 655 556 27 24 1,262
1975 1550 754 39 33 2,376
1976 374 374 76 37 861
1977 461 442 54 35 992
1978 728 723 74 21 1,546
Source: World Bank (1981)
Livestock production and exports were also affected by natural 
calamities, specifically droughts. Droughts led to the perishing of 
life animals and in turn reduced their population which also meant 
a decrease in the volume of exports. Somalia underwent a serious 
drought every 10 to 15 years and the most remarkable one in the 
period under study was Dabadheer in 1973-74 whose effect on the live-
stock population was so enormous that “about 1,000,000 cattle (25% of 
total stock), 500,000 camels (6% of the total stock), and 5,700,000 goats 
and sheep (20% of the stock) were estimated to have perished.”26 By 
the same token, a World Bank report recorded that in 1978 (five years 
after the drought), the volume of livestock exports was still lower than 
that of the pre-drought years and did not recover fully.27       
Livestock exports were also crippled by poor government policies. 
When Somalia embraced “scientific socialism” in 1970, livestock and 
banana – the two principal export commodities – remained in pri-
vate hands amid the nationalization of all other economic activities.28 
The government policy responses were unsuccessful in encouraging 
and subsidizing livestock exports to utilize the expeditiously rising 
demand in Saudi Arabia. Relying on tariffs for revenue, “the central 
government’s tax revenue from trade taxes was 65%, on average” in 
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the 1970s; similarly, “the ratio of international trade taxes to the gross 
domestic product was 6-7%.”29 
Berbera Port, in the North, was where the majority of the livestock 
were exported. For instance, roughly 80 percent of Somalia’s total live-
stock exports were administered by Berbera Port in the period of the 
late 1970s and early 1980s.30 However, as a result of the civil war in the 
Northern regions in the late 1980s, the port became out of operation.
Table 2: Somalia: Livestock Exports from Berbera Port, 1967-73
Year Sheep Goats Cattle Camel Total 
1967 534,432 340,944 29,412 26,786 931,574
1968 741,078 483,763 38,377 17,781 1,280,999
1969 653,526 669,399 31,042 23,542 1,378,281
1970 517,211 540,869 41,648 24,314 1,124,042
1971 552,781 519,872 47,386 22,629 1,142,668
1972 753,669 749,432 73,385 18,676 1,595,162
1973 601,742 593,339 61,930 27,507 1,284,518
Source: World Bank (1975)
Banana
Banana, the second most important export product after livestock, is 
grown in the fertile land along the Juba and Shabelle rivers in Southern 
Somalia. Colonial Italy created, expanded, and modernized banana 
production through sizable plantations and irrigation schemes, lay-
ing the foundation for commercial exports. Consequently, the Somali 
banana was first exported to Italy in 1927.31 Following Somalia’s inde-
pendence in 1960, Somali farmers were given access to the banana 
farms, but Italians still had bigger plantations and produced a consid-
erable share of the exported banana.32 In the early 1960s, the banana 
industry employed roughly 25,000 people.33  Despite some progress 
in the banana industry in the early 1970s (increased production and 
cultivated areas), the industry experienced ample setbacks under the 
socialist regime. Even though the government established the National 
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Banana Board–which turned out to be ineffective–the total output 
dwindled over two-thirds while the cultivated area shrunk over half 
between 1973 and 1981.34 Similarly, export earnings from banana fell 
considerably in the same period, and Farzin (1988:10) explains the 
decline as follows:
This poor export performance was partly due to increased compe-
tition in export markets, but principally reflected the dramatic decline 
in the area planted and hence in domestic output as a consequence of 
inadequate domestic price incentives and shortages of inputs, fuel, and 
tractor services during 1975-81.  
Figure 2
Source: World Bank (1975)
Given that the banana was produced mainly for exports, as the local 
banana consumption was minimal, the level of production depended 
on the external demand.35  In consequence of the 1981 SAP (Structural 
Adjustment Program) agreement by the Somali Government and the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF), banana exports recovered and 
increased dramatically except two years (1984 and 1985) of flooding 
and crop loss. However, Abdi Samatar who studied the impact of SAPs 
on the banana industry and Somali economy in general, argues that 
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the liberalization of the banana sector improved the production and 
exports of the industry but the Somali people were not the primary 
beneficiaries of this program:  
Liberal reforms in the banana sector did not lead to development, 
however, as nearly 75 percent of earnings from exports were real-
ized by overseas interests, depriving Somalia of an important 
source of capital for reinvestment (40).








(in Millions of 
Somali Shil-
lings)1
1975 106.0 81.8 80.9
1976 96.6 72.5 85.1
1977 65.2 53.8 64.7
1978 69.7 57.5 70.2
1979 72.2 55.5 68.5
1980 60.4 35.4 46.6
1981 59.0 34.4 66.2
1982 78.7 50.7 153.6
1983 98.9 62.4 234.4
1984 62.2 47.9 283.9
1985 60.0 45,3 871.0
 
Source: World Bank (1987) 
1Average official exchange rate for 1985 was US $1=So. Sh. 40.175
Other Export Products 
Having a coastline of over 3000 km (the longest on mainland Africa) 
and largely pastoralist population, Somalia’s fisheries sector is highly 
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unexploited. The fisheries share in the GDP is below one percent while 
the sector employs around two percent of the population.36 Accounting 
for merely two percent of the total export earnings, exports of fish and 
its byproducts grew throughout the 1970s as a result of Soviet Union 
assistance, but both production and exports dropped in the first quar-
ter of the 1980s due to the breakdown of the Somalia-Soviet relations 
in 1978 coupled with tough control on pricing and marketing by the 
government.37 Italy and Australia filled the Soviet Union’s shoes and 
supported the fishing cooperatives after 1978, but they were not profit-
able.38 Larger exploitation of the sector started after the 1973-74 Dabad-
heer drought when many nomadic pastoralists were resettled in fishing 
cooperatives. As depicted in Table 4, fish exports were high between 
1974 and 1976 where exports exceeded 3000 metric tons in 1976.
Table 4: Somalia: Fish Exports, 1972-78 
Year Exports  
(Metric Tons)









Source: World Bank (1981) 
1Official exchange rate: US$1 = So. Sh. 6.295
Hides and skins were other animal products exported by Somalia. 
Although their share in the total export earnings was negligible, they 
generated between 9 and 50 million So. Sh. in the period of 1973-78; 
their share in total export earnings ranged between 1.8 and 8.6 percent 
in the same period.39 Likewise, they generated a mere 11 million So. 
Sh. in 1984 but 294 and 704 million So. Sh. in 1985 and 1986, respec-
tively.40 Government policies also undermined the expansion of this 
sector which could be a significant source of export earnings. The 
government’s Hides and Skins Agency (HASA) had a monopoly in 
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gathering and exporting the hides and skins, as well as imposed very 
low prices on them which discouraged any private involvement in 
this industry.41   
Meat and meat products exports were also trivial and their export 
earnings were valued between 0.3 and 44 million So. Sh. in 1973-78; 
their share in total export earnings ranged between 0.1 and 9.2 percent 
in the same period (1981). Furthermore, their exports generated 6.5 
and 2.7 million So. Sh. in 1980 and 1983, respectively.42 
Frankincense and myrrh, also insignificant export commodities, 
were known for Somalia as early as ancient times – Somalia was known 
as the Land of Punt. Myrrh, for instance, generated roughly 230 and 
253 million So. Sh. of export earnings in 1987 and 1988, respectively.43 
Government policies partially crippled this industry as the govern-
ment-sponsored cooperatives were given a monopoly for exporting 
frankincense and myrrh.44  
IV. Imports
Being a highly open economy, Somalia imported raw materials, inter-
mediate products, and finished goods as well. Among the wide-ranging 
import commodities included food, textile, medicine, transportation, 
cement and building materials, equipment, iron and steel, machinery, 
petroleum, agricultural inputs, etc.45 Despite the government’s rhetoric 
on achieving food self-sufficiency, the local production often failed 
to keep up with the rapidly increasing consumption. Consequently, 
between the mid-1970s and the late 1980s, “Somalia has become alarm-
ingly, and more than any other country in Sub-Saharan Africa, depen-
dent on imported food.”46 This was a striking fact given that Somalia 
primarily had an agricultural and pastoral economy and should have 
logically been food self-sufficient, even though it sometimes enjoyed a 
food grain sufficiency. Farzin, who is one of the few who deeply stud-
ied this topic, captures the reality of Somalia’s shocking food import 
dependency in the 1970s and 80s as follows: 
Indeed, even with the exclusion of the years of war and drought 
from the sample period, the value of food import shows a trend 
that has been growing at an annual rate of more than 21 per-
cent. The extent of Somalia's dependency on food import is better 
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understood when it is noted that the share of food import in total 
volume of food consumption rose from less than 33 percent on 
average for 1970-79 period to over 63 percent during the 1980-84 
period, implying a trend growth in Somalia's food import depen-
dency at the average rate of 8.3 percent per annum during the 
1970-84 period.50 
The 1973-74 catastrophic Dabadheer drought and 1977-78 Ethiopi-
an-Somali war refugees also paved the way for food aid and in turn 
made Somalia food aid dependent. This foreign food dependency 
affected the consumption habits of the population, those in urban 
areas in particular, as they became more interested in imported cereals 
(rice for example) than locally produced maize and sorghum. In addi-
tion, the government partly contributed to this problem as its policies 
favored the urban dwellers and hurt the local farmers. The National 
Trading Agency (also known as ENC) was mandated to import food to 
fill the gap between the local production and consumption, subsidize 
food imports, and control the local prices to not be higher than their 
import parity prices.47 The irony here is bewildering – the government 
promoted a food self-sufficiency rhetoric while at the same time dis-
couraging domestic food production.  
In spite of always being higher than the exports, imports were often 
restricted by the government either directly or through higher taxes 
to address the worsening balance of payments. In the early 1970s, the 
imports of certain commodities were cut – tea by 57 percent, wheat 
flour by 52 percent, and pasta products by 45 percent.48 However, 
as a result of the liberalization policies adopted in the early 1980s, 
few products needed prior approval for importation by the mid-1980s; 
among them were petroleum, alcohol, explosives, medicines, precious 
metals and minerals, and tobacco.49 By the same token, the govern-
ment’s import tariffs, motivated by revenue generation, were high and 
their structure was described as irrational and complicated.50 Mubarak 
(1996:133) agrees – “The ex post facto average effective rates were 29% 
and 21% in 1975–80 and 1981–88, respectively.”  Given that imports 
were always higher than the exports, the government used external aid 
and debt to fill the gap. What portion of the imports were financed by 
aid/loan in the 1980s is summarized here: 
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During the 1980s, the bulk of merchandise imports constituted 
official grants, mostly in kind, and imports for PIP [Public Invest-
ment Program]. In the 1981–88 period, about 41 % of total imports 
(including transfer costs) were grants in kind, while about 22% 
were financed by loans of PIP. The remainder of the imports, 
about 37 %, were cash imports.51  
As far as the trade partners are concerned, Somalia imported from 
different parts of the World. Here are Somalia imports’ major coun-
tries of origin in 1973-78, according to the World Bank (1981): Italy, 
the Federal Republic of Germany, France, United Kingdom, USSR, 
Kenya, Ethiopia, China, Japan, Thailand, Hong Kong, Saudi Arabia, 
the People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen, and the United States. If 
we compare the import value (in millions of So. Sh.) of the regions of 
these countries, using the same data and taking 1975 as an example, it 
looks like this: Western Europe (499), Eastern Europe (83), Africa (100), 
Asia (196), Middle East (62), and Western Hemisphere (33).      
V. Trade Balance
The Somali economy experienced chronic trade deficits in the period 
of 1960-91 as the value of imports exceeded that of exports at all times. 
In 1985, exports were a quarter of imports while the ratio of trade 
deficit to GDP was 21 percent.52 As illustrated in Table 5, the economy 
suffered from negative trade balances and remained in trade deficits in 
1975-85. Imports were four and half times, six and half times, and four 
times more than exports in 1983, 1984, and 1985, respectively.
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Table 5: Somalia: Exports, Imports, and Trade Balance 
Millions of US$ 
Year Exports Imports Trade Balance
1975 88.6 162.2 -73.6
1976 81.0 176.1 -95.1
1977 71.3 256.9 -185.6
1978 109.5 275.5 -166.0
1979 106.0 15,616 -288.2
1980 134.2 394.2 -326.8
1981 114.0 461.0 -308.0
1982 136.9 422.0 -347.1
1983 100.7 484.0 -349.3
1984 62.0 450.0 -344.0
1985 92.5 362.0 -269.5
Source: World Bank (1987)
It turns out that the nation’s export products and their earnings 
could not set off the total imports for a number of reasons. As already 
discussed, the Somali livestock economy was dependent on a single 
market – Saudi Arabia – which made it vulnerable to the external 
shocks from that market – Saudi Arabia’s bans on Somali livestock 
imports hardly hit the Somali economy. Additionally, livestock produc-
tion suffered from natural disasters (chiefly droughts), which reduced 
the livestock population. The government policies were not in favor of 
the sector as well. The banana industry, on the contrary, suffered from 
poor management and lack of investment but then most of the export 
profits were acquired by foreign interests when the industry was 
invested by SAPs. This was coupled with rapidly increasing domestic 
consumption and preference for imported food, mainly in urban areas. 
Even though the official rate of the Somali Shillings often appreciated 
against the other currencies and Somalia enjoyed improving terms of 
trade, which increased cash imports, the economy also suffered from 
occasionally declining terms of trade. In most of the available data 
from this period, you will come across highly valued official rates of 
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the Somali Shillings, not to mention that the liberalization policies 
embraced in the early 1980s mandated the devaluation of the Somali 
Shillings.  
These perennial trade deficits, which were part of a larger balance of 
payments deficits, compelled the Somali Government to rely on exter-
nal aid and borrowing for deficit financing. 
Figure 3
VI. Conclusion
This article examined the trade deficits of Somalia in 1960-91. The 
study found that Somalia experienced chronic trade deficits through-
out the three post-independence decades. Despite food self-sufficiency 
rhetoric by the government, the local production failed to keep up 
with the rapidly increasing domestic consumption which led to ris-
ing levels of imports and food import dependency. Similarly, exports 
were undermined by external shocks, inadequate policies, and natural 
disasters. Due to the perennial balance of payments deficits, including 
trade deficits, Somalia used external aid and borrowing to finance the 
deficit.
Notwithstanding some degree of debate, most of the mainstream 
economists agree that trade a deficit is not a bad thing per se. According 
to Lawrence (2018), “trade deficits are not necessarily bad, do not nec-
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essarily cost jobs or reduce growth, and are not a measure of whether 
foreign trade policies or agreements with other countries are fair or 
unfair.” He also contends that since international trade enables coun-
tries to purchase goods and services at a price lower than the cost 
they would be if produced locally or to sell their goods and services 
at higher prices in overseas markets than they could be sold local 
markets, “a trade deficit that is associated with large volumes of both 
imports and exports could actually be more beneficial than a trade 
surplus in which trade volumes are low.” Gould and Ruffin (1996) also 
conclude that trade deficit has a trivial impact on the long-run eco-
nomic growth. On the contrary, Mankiw (2006) argues that the trade 
deficit is not a problem per se but an indication of low levels of national 
savings. Similarly, Alessandaria (2007) contends that a trade deficit is a 
good signal as it implies that the country is borrowing for investment. 
Trade balance – be it a deficit or a surplus – is therefore an implication 
of a nation’s international borrowing/lending position.53
It is true that Somalia’s foreign debt went through the ceiling in 
the period under study, but there is no evidence that those loans were 
used for productive and profitable investments. They were  invested in 
some public infrastructure and the correcting deficits. Here lies a large 
part of the reasons why trade deficits had persisted.
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